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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONGRESS'S
SPENDING CLAUSE POWER-THE SUPREME COURT SUPPORTS MILITARY
RECRUITERS AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS DESPITE LAW SCHOOLS' PROTESTS. Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, higher education has emerged as perhaps the sin-
gle most successful industry in the United States, and government funding
has helped fuel that success.' Thanks to the Spending Clause in Article I,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress "to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes [which power]
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitu-
tion,"2 Congress has been more than willing to provide federal funding to
support higher education. By using its Spending Clause power, however,
Congress has also been able to attach various conditions on the receipt of
federal funds that it might not otherwise have been able to do pursuant to the
Constitution.4 From ensuring gender equality in high-school sports under
Title IX, to requiring standardized testing mandates through the No Child
Left Behind Act, Congress has been more than willing to attach various
conditions on a school's receipt of federal educational funding.5
This note examines the forces in play leading up to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institu-
tional Rights, Inc.,6 a case in which the Court upheld a federal law condi-
tioning the receipt of federal funding by law schools (and other institutions
of higher learning) on those schools granting United States Military recrui-
ters equal access to students, despite First Amendment claims brought by
1. Marvin Lazerson, The Changing Educational Quality of the Workforce: The Disap-
pointments of Success: Higher Education After World War 11, 559 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 64, 66-67 (1998).
2. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936)) (internal quotations omitted).
3. Lazerson, supra note 1, at 67.
4. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
5. See Beverly Brandt Tiesenga, Title LX and the Outer Limits of the Spending Powers,
61 CHI.-KENTrr. L. REV. 711, 712-13 (1985); see also Nicole Liguori, Note, Leaving No Child
Behind (Except in States That Don't Do as We Say): Connecticut's Challenge to the Federal
Government 's Power to Control State Education Policy Through the Spending Clause, 47
B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2006).
6. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
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those schools.7 This note first explores the facts leading to the controversy
that culminated in an appeal to the Supreme Court.8 Next, this note explores
the background of the issues presented by Rumsfeld, including the United
States military's historic treatment of homosexuals, the law schools' disa-
greement with military recruiters, and the background of the First Amend-
ment arguments invoked by the law schools in an attempt to avoid being
forced to accommodate military recruiters.9 Finally, this note explains the
Court's reasoning in Rumsfeld ° and concludes with a discussion of the sig-
nificance of the Rumsfeld decision. The significance section further illu-
strates how this decision-the first major decision of the Court since the
death of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the retirement of Justice O'Connor-
may foreshadow the direction of the Court's future decisions relating to mil-
itary affairs and political matters.'
2
II. FACTS
Since the 1970s, many law schools have included sexual orientation in
their anti-discrimination policies, and as a result of the United States mili-
tary's historical discrimination against homosexual soldiers and recruits,
many schools have been less than enthusiastic about granting military re-
cruiters access to law students.' 3 In an attempt to remedy law school dis-
crimination against military recruiters, Congress passed the Solomon
Amendment in 1994, which conditioned the receipt of federal funding on a
school's granting military recruiters access to students.' 4 In order to preserve
the law schools' (and their respective universities') federal funding, most
law schools grudgingly began to allow military recruiters access to stu-
dents. 5 Many schools, however, still refused to provide military recruiters
the same administrative services or perks provided to other recruiters. 6
7. Id. at 1313.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Nina Totenberg, High Court Upholds Military Recruiting at Colleges, NPR radio
broadcast (Mar. 6, 2006) (transcript on file with author); see also Patrick Healy, Despite
Concerns, Law Schools Admit Military Recruiters, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2002, at Al.
14. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (Supp. 1999). Although the Solomon Amendment applies to all
institutions of higher education, the Solomon Amendment was primarily aimed at law
schools. Bob Egelko, High Court Lets Military Recruit at Law Schools, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7,
2006, at Al.
15. Totenberg, supra note 13; see also Healy, supra note 13, at Al.
16. Totenberg, supra note 13; see also Healy, supra note 13, at Al.
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Shortly after the September II attacks, the Department of Defense
(DoD) began to push aggressively for access to students on the same terms
as those enjoyed by private employers, threatening to jeopardize the federal
funding provided to noncomplying schools. 17 Unhappy with the DoD's en-
forcement of the Solomon Amendment, law schools and law professors
from around the country formed the Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR) in 2003 with the express purpose of opposing the Solomon
Amendment's "violation of the schools' First Amendment rights."'
' 8
On September 19, 2003, the Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc.; the Society of American Law Teachers, Inc.; the Coalition for
Equality; Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus; law professors Erwin Cheme-
rinsky and Sylvia Law; and law students Pam Nickisher, Leslie Fischer,
Ph.D., and Michael Blauschild (collectively referred to as FAIR) filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the DoD, and others, seeking a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. 9 FAIR contended before the District Court that the
Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional because it (1) conditioned re-
ceipt of federal funding on law schools surrendering their First Amendment
rights of academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom of expressive
association, (2) discriminated against law schools on the basis of viewpoint
by promoting a pro-military recruiting message at the expense of punishing
schools who disagree with the military's policy concerning homosexuals,
and (3) violated the void-for-vagueness doctrine for lack of clear guidelines
and for conferring unbridled discretion on the DoD to determine what insti-
tutions were in compliance with the Solomon Amendment, and thus, entitled
to federal funding.2" FAIR then moved for a preliminary injunction, which
the DoD opposed on the grounds that the Solomon Amendment was a valid
exercise of Congress's Spending Clause power that conditioned federal
funding on conduct unrelated to speech.2'
The district court denied FAIR's motion for preliminary injunction on
the grounds that FAIR had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits, a necessary element justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.22
The district court was careful to point out that its finding for the DoD was
17. Totenberg, supra note 13; see also Healy, supra note 13, at Al.
18. Kent Greenfield, Imposing Inequality on Law Schools, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10,
2003, at A25. Kent Greenfield is a law professor at Boston College and is the president of
FAIR. Id.
19. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 274-76 (D.N.J. 2003).
20. Id. at 274-75.




based solely on the district court's belief that "the Solomon Amendment, as
an exercise of Congress's spending power and its power and obligation to
raise military forces, on balance, is not violative of the First Amendment.,
23
The district court further prefaced its ruling with the disclaimer that "as with
all constitutional challenges to legislation, the question is not whether the
Court believes that the legislation is wise or unwise, or even fair or unfair.,
24
FAIR then appealed the district court's denial of the motion for preliminary
injunction.25
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court's denial of FAIR's motion for preliminary injunc-
tion.26 The court of appeals examined each of FAIR's constitutional claims
and concluded that FAIR had established a likelihood of success on the me-
rits of each of the constitutional claims. 7 The court of appeals explained that
"the Solomon Amendment requires law schools to express a message that is
incompatible with their educational objectives, and no compelling govern-
mental interest has been shown to deny this freedom., 28 The court also con-
cluded that the DoD had failed to provide any evidence that the Solomon
Amendment's "restrictions on speech are no more than [what is] required to
further its interest in attracting good legal counsel., 29 The court of appeals
then reversed the district court and ordered the district court to enter a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.3"
The DoD immediately appealed the Third Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari."
III. BACKGROUND
With issues including gay rights, national defense, and the First
Amendment rights of schools, Rumsfeld is a case that is as much about poli-
tics and current events as it is about case law and constitutional issues.
Therefore, in order to assist the reader with a full understanding of the com-
plex issues surrounding Rumsfeld, this section first explores the origin of the
United States Military's stance on homosexuals, beginning with its founding
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I), 390 F.3d 219,
228 (3d Cir. 2004).
26. Id. at 224.








during the American Revolution.32 Next, this section traces the policies and
events of the early 1990s that led to the formation and evolution of the now
infamous "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.33 This section will then examine
the current events of the late 1990s and early 2000s that led to the formation
of FAIR and the controversy culminating in the Court's decision in Rums-
feld.34 Finally, this section will examine the contemporary state of First
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to the issues presented in Rumsfeld.35
A. The Origins of the United States Military's Stance on Homosexuals3 6
On March 14, 1778, General George Washington entered the following
general order while camped with the Continental Army at Valley Forge:
At a General Court Martial whereof Colo. Tupper was President (10th
March 1778) Lieutt. Enslin of Colo. Malcom's Regiment tried for at-
tempting to commit sodomy, with John Monhort a soldier; Secondly, For
Perjury in swearing to false Accounts, found guilty of the charges exhi-
bited against him, being breaches of 5th. Article 18th. Section of the Ar-
ticles of War and do sentence him to be dismiss'd the service with Infa-
my. His Excellency the Commander in Chief approves the sentence and
with Abhorrence and Detestation of such Infamous Crimes orders Lieutt.
Enslin to be drummed out of Camp tomorrow morning by all the Drum-
mers and Fifers in the Army never to return; The Drummers and Fifers to
attend on the Grand Parade at Guard mounting for that Purpose.37
Pursuant to the order, Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin was dismissed
from the Continental Army and became the first reported "gay discharge"
from the United States Military.38
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. See infra Part II1.B.
34. See infra Part III.C.
35. See infra Part III.D.
36. This section refers to sodomy and homosexuality interchangeably; however, this is a
misnomer as sodomy is a sexual act that can be committed by both homosexual and hetero-
sexual couples. Because "homosexuals have been restricted through either personnel regula-
tions or the application of the sodomy provisions of military law," NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH
INST., MR-323-OSD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL
POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 3 (1993) [hereinafter RESEARCH INST.], this subsection
will discuss the military prohibition of sodomy as if it applied only to homosexual soldiers
and as if sodomy were analogous to homosexuality.
37. George Washington, General Orders at Valley Forge on March 14, 1778 (1778),
reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 83-84 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., United
States Gov't Printing Office 1934).
38. Sharon E. Debbage, Symposium, A Ban by Any Other Name: Ten Years of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, " 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403, 405 (2004). It should be noted that
Enslin was drummed out of the Continental Army, not for being homosexual per se, but for
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Though general military law has criminalized sodomy "since time im-
memorial," American military law did not specifically criminalize sodomy
until 1920.' 9 In 1775, the Continental Congress adopted its first Articles of
War governing the newly formed Continental Army, which articles were
largely based on the British Articles of War of 1765.4o Like the British Ar-
ticles of War then in effect, the American Articles of War did not explicitly
prohibit sodomy or homosexual soldiers from serving in the military.4' Ra-
ther, soldiers engaging in sodomitic activities were punished based on their
violations of applicable civilian or common law.42
After the adoption of the Articles of War of 1916, the military prose-
cuted "sodomy and other unnatural crimes" under the catch-all provisions of
Article of War 96." Then, in 1920, Congress amended the 1916 Articles to
specifically include sodomy as a punishable offense, and for the first time,
sodomy became an explicitly punishable crime in the United States Mili-
tary.
allegedly engaging in a homosexual act with another soldier. Washington, supra note 37, at
83-84.
39. Major Eugene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should Be Constitutionally
Protected in the Military by the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REv. 91, 94-95 (2002) (citing
United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.M.A. 1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
40. Major Christopher W. Behan, Don't Tug on Superman 's Cape: In Defense of Con-
vening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L.
REv. 190, 208-09 (2003).
41. Captain Erik C. Coyne, Note, Check Your Privacy Rights at the Front Gate: Con-
sensual Sodomy Regulation in Today's Military Following United States v. Marcum, 35 U.
BALT. L. REv. 239, 244 (2005). The British Articles of War of 1749 did include an express
prohibition against sodomy; however, this reference to sodomy was not included in the Brit-
ish Articles of War of 1765. Id. at 244. The failure to explicitly criminalize sodomy in the
1765 Articles and the American Articles is understandable given that noted commentator
Lord William Blackstone described sodomy in his Commentaries on the Laws of England as
that "infamous crime against nature ... not fit to be named; 'peccatum illud horribile, inter
christianos non nominandum [that horrible sin not to be mentioned among Christians].'
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 215 (1769) (emphasis supplied).
42. Debbage, supra note 38, at 405. Debbage states that the first prohibition against
sodomy in United States Military law appeared in the 1916 Articles; however, the prohibition
against sodomy as a separate offense did not appear in the Articles of War until its amend-
ment in 1920. Id. at 405 n.15.
43. United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 53 (C.M.A. 1979).
Article 96 of the Articles of War of 1916 provided the following:
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the preju-
dice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discre-
dit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which per-
sons subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a
general or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
Federal Possession and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat. 619, 666 (1916).
44. Harris, 8 M.J. at 53. In 1920, Congress amended Article of War 93, which listed the
"various crimes" punishable by court-martial, to include sodomy for the first time. Id. at 56.
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Between World War I and World War II, the military "attempted to
screen and exclude homosexuals from service by utilizing contemporary,
biological theories about the causes and manifestations of homosexuality." '45
For example, Army Regulation 40-105, instituted in 1921, defined its "stig-
ma of degeneration" to include characteristics such as an "overly feminine
[appearance], with sloping shoulders, broad hips, and absence of secondary
sex characteristics[,] including facial and body hair., 46 Additionally, in-
cluded in the exclusion criteria was "sexual psychopathy, which included
sexual relations between men., 47 As a result of these policies, the military
often administratively discharged homosexual soldiers under a "Section
VIII" discharge.48
During World War II, the United States military re-examined its poli-
cies regarding homosexuals; in fact, the United States Army revised its own
policies regarding homosexual soldiers more than twenty-four times during
the war.49 Freudian-inspired psychologists developed theories that homosex-
uality and military service were incompatible due to homosexuals' "inapti-
tude for combat and lack of trustworthiness."50 As a result, homosexuals
were banned from serving in the military solely because of their sexual
orientation and regardless of whether they had engaged in sodomy.51 Under
the new policies, homosexuals were barred from joining the military and
were discharged upon discovery. 2
The Article listed only sodomy and was silent as to whether both heterosexual and homosex-
ual sodomy or just homosexual sodomy was punishable. Army Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759, 805 (1920). Additionally, many sources, including the Rand Report
of 1993, erroneously state that Article 93 of the 1916 Articles mentioned sodomy; however,
this revision did not appear until 1920. See Debbage, supra note 38, at 405 n. 15.
45. RESEARCH INST., supra note 36, at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Army Regulation 40-105 (1921) (internal quotations omitted)).
48. Id. A "Section VIII" discharge was used to separate insane and otherwise psycholog-
ically unfit soldiers from the military, and it had been popularized in the media thanks to
fictional characters such as Corporal Klinger of M*A *S*H and Captain Yossarian of Catch
22. Major Susan L. Turley, Book Note, 170 MIL. L. REv. 197, 199 (2001) (reviewing BEN
SHEPARD, A WAR OF NERVES: SOLDIERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2001)).
49. RESEARCH INST., supra note 36, at 5.
50. Debbage, supra note 38, at 406.
51. Id. at 406; RESEARCH INST., supra note 36, at 6.
52. RESEARCH INST., supra note 36, at 6.
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B. The Evolution of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy and the United
States Military's Current Stance Towards Homosexuals
In 1992, then-Governor Bill Clinton campaigned in part on a pledge to
end homosexual discrimination in the military if elected president.53 Shortly
after taking office in January 1993, Clinton attempted to fulfill his campaign
promise to end discrimination against homosexuals by instituting a review
of the United States military's policies concerning homosexuals.54 Clinton,
however, faced opposition, not only from Congress but also from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff over his plan to end sexual-orientation discrimination in the
military." As a result, Clinton was forced to abandon his plan to end homo-
sexual discrimination in the military outright, and instead, he implemented a
compromise intended to be "practical, realistic, and consistent with the high
standards of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion.",1
6
Pursuant to the President's instructions, Secretary of Defense Les As-
pin formed a Military Working Group to analyze the DoD's homosexual
policies and to suggest revisions consistent with the President's instruc-
tions.57 The Military Working Group's conclusion included the following:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the
military of individuals identified as homosexuals would have a signifi-
cantly adverse effect on both unit cohesion and the readiness of the
force-the key ingredients of combat effectiveness. If identified homo-
sexuals are allowed to serve, they will compromise the high standards of
combat effectiveness which must be maintained, impacting on the ability
of the Armed Forces to perform its mission. 8
Further, the Military Working Group concluded that even homosexuals who
were unknown to the military or who otherwise kept their sexual orientation
a secret still posed a threat to the military.5 9 The Military Working Group
determined that "closeted" homosexuals would "undermine combat effec-
tiveness through, for example, high risk behavior and the formation of a
'sub-culture' outside the chain of command," or they would eventually be
found out and discharged.6'
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 1.
55. Philip Shenon, New Study Faults Pentagon's Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997,
at AI0; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism and Institutional
Reform, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217,221 (1993).
56. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP
(July 1, 1993), at 1 [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT]; Shenon, supra note 55, at A10.
57. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 56, at 1.
58. Id. at 12.




Despite the military's continued resistance, Secretary Aspin issued a
memorandum dated July 19, 1993, in which the military instituted the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 61 Under this revision, the military still held
that homosexuality was incompatible with military service, but noted that
many homosexuals had served the United States with distinction.6 2 Under
the new policy, homosexual conduct was still grounds for discharge, but
sexual orientation was "considered a personal and private matter., 63 Thus,
homosexual orientation was "not a bar to service entry or continued service
unless manifested by homosexual conduct."' Further, the policy forbade
commanders from asking servicemembers about their sexual orientation and
forbade commanders from investigating a servicemember's sexual orienta-
tion.65 These restrictions, however, were lifted when a commander had
"credible information" that a basis for discharge existed.66 Credible informa-
tion constituting a basis for discharge under the policy included statements
or actions by a servicemember, such as holding hands with a member of the
same sex, which would tend to indicate that the servicemember was homo-
sexual.67 In November 1993, Congress followed President Clinton's lead
and passed Public Law 103-160, which codified the provisions of the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy into United States law.68
C. Current Events Leading to Rumsfeld
Since the 1970s, many law schools across the country have required
that all recruiters seeking to use the schools' career services facilities sign an
agreement stating that they do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or sexual orientation. 69 In 1990, the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) formally adopted this practice and required all member
institutions to obtain non-discrimination statements from recruiters. 70 As a
result of the United States ilitary's long and continued history of discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, and as a result of military recruiters' inability to
comply with the AALS anti-discriminatory mandate, many law school cam-
61. See Memorandum from Les Aspin, Sec'y of Def. to the Sec'y of the Army et al.,
(July 19, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memo].
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id.; see also Abrams, supra note 55, at 221.
67. Memo, supra note 61, at 2; see also Abrams, supra note 55, at 221.
68. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
69. Totenberg, supra note 13.
70. Michael J. Collins, Current Event, Fair v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004),
13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 717, 718 (2005).
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puses simply banned military recruiters from campus. 71 This ban continued
at many member institutions even after the enactment of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy.
7 2
In 1994, Congress responded to the ban of military recruiters in law
schools and other institutes of higher education by passing the Solomon
Amendment. 7 The law was inspired in part by the AALS position on sexual
orientation discrimination in law schools.74 The amendment forbade any
university from restricting military recruitment on campus at the risk of los-
ing federal DoD dollars." In 1997, Congress amended the Solomon
Amendment to jeopardize a university's receipt of not only DoD funds, but
also funds administered by other federal agencies, including the Depart-
71. Id. at 718-19; see also Totenberg, supra note 13.
72. Collins, supra note 70, at 719; Totenberg, supra note 13. Despite the recent ruling in
Rumsfeld, the AALS continues to maintain that member institutions must require employers
to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS,
INC., BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, INC. § 6.3 (Amended Jan.
2004), available at http://www.aals.org.cnchost.com/abouthandbook requirements.php (last
visited Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter BYLAWS] (setting forth the requirement that member
institutions cannot discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); Ass'N OF AM. LAW
SCHOOLS, INC., EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS 6-3.2 (Amended Jan. 2006), available at http://www.aals.org.cnchost.com
/abouthandbook regulations.php#6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter REGULATIONS]
(setting forth the requirement that member institutions must inform employers of the school's
anti-sexual-orientation discrimination policy and obtain written agreements from employers).
The University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law is a member of
the AALS.
73. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (1994); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV.
461, 516 (2005). During the congressional debate on the Solomon Amendment, Congressman
Richard Pombo spoke in favor of the Solomon Amendment and offered the following re-
marks:
[I]nstitutions of higher education in this country need to be put on notice that
their policies of ambivalence or hostility towards our Nation's armed services do
not go unnoticed .... A growing, and misguided, sense of moral superiority is
creeping into the policies of colleges and universities in this country when it
comes to such things as military recruiting or ROTC activities on campus....
These colleges and universities need to know that their starry-eyed idealism
comes with a price. If they are too good-or too righteous-to treat our Nation's
military with the respect it deserves ... or to afford our military the same recruit-
ing opportunities offered to private corporations-then they may also be too
good to receive the generous level of taxpayer dollars presently enjoyed by many
institutions of higher education in America .... I urge my colleagues to support
the Solomon amendment, and send a message over the wall of the ivory tower of
higher education.
140 CONG. REC. H3860 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Pombo).
74. Egelko, supra note 14, at Al.
75. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (1994); Horwitz, supra note 73, at 516-17.
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ments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Educa-
71tion.
The Solomon Amendment was again amended in 1999 to clarify which
federal funds would be withheld from which institution. 7' The 1999 amend-
ment "penaliz[es] an offending 'subelement' of a college or university (i.e.,
a law school) that prohibits or effectively prevents military recruiting with
the loss of federal funding from all of the federal agencies identified in the
statute, while withholding from the offending subelement's parent institu-
tion only D[o]D funds."78 The loss of federal funding due to non-compliance
with the Solomon Amendment was no idle threat to universities. 79 For ex-
ample, non-compliance could have meant a loss of nearly $1 billion in fed-
eral funding to Columbia, Harvard, and Yale combined in 2003.80
As a direct result of the Solomon Amendment, law schools across the
country were forced to suspend their non-discrimination policies with regard
to military recruiters.8' Schools grudgingly permitted military recruiters to
come onto campus; however, schools continued to protest the military's
discrimination against homosexuals by refusing to provide military recrui-
ters with equal access to administrative services that the career services de-
partments provided to other recruiters.82 For example, many schools allowed
military recruiters to recruit on campus but refused to (1) send e-mails to the
student body informing students of the recruiters' presence, (2) post flyers
regarding recruitment, and (3) otherwise provide military recruiters with the
same "perks" provided to other recruiters.83
Shortly after the change in administration and the September 11 at-
tacks, the DoD began to push for military recruiters' access to students, as
guaranteed by the Solomon Amendment. 84 The DoD also began to push ag-
gressively for access to students on the same terms granted to other employ-
76. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld ("FAIR IT'), 390 F.3d 219,
226 (3d Cir. 2004).
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing 32 C.F.R. § 216.3(b)(1)); see also 10 U.S.C. § 983 (1999); Horwitz, supra
note 72, at 517.
79. Healy, supra note 13, at Al.
80. Id.
81. Horwitz, supra note 72, at 517.
82. Totenberg, supra note 13.
83. Id. The Loyola University School of Law in Chicago went so far as to deny military
recruiters the free lunch provided to other recruiters on campus. Frank James and Jodi S.
Cohen, Court Sides with Military; Colleges Accepting Federal Money Must Not Bar Recrui-
ters, CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 7, 2006, at CI.
84. See Totenberg, supra note 13; see also Healy, supra note 13, at Al.
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ers-for example, access to the same administrative services and perks pro-
vided to other employers."
Unhappy with the DoD's enforcement of the Solomon Amendment,
law schools from around the country formed the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR) in 2003 with the express purpose of opposing
"the violation of the schools' First Amendment rights." 6 On September 19,
2003, FAIR filed suit against the DoD seeking to prohibit enforcement of
the Solomon Amendment. 7 At that time, FAIR declined to disclose which
law schools formed the organization out of fear of retribution from the DoD,
although four member schools were willing to be publicly associated with
FAIR: New York University, Golden Gate University School of Law, Whit-
tier Law School, and Chicago-Kent College of Law.88
D. The Solomon Amendment and Relevant First Amendment Jurispru-
dence
In holding that the Solomon Amendment was an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the First Amendment rights of FAIR's member institutions,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on a variety
of First Amendment grounds.89 These grounds included the following: (1)
the Solomon Amendment's requirements concerning the required admission
of military recruiters to law schools' campuses is tantamount to compelled,
expressive speech; (2) the law schools affected by the Solomon Amendment
have a First Amendment right of association (and its converse, to be free of
compelled association); and (3) the Solomon Amendment's federal funding
conditions amount to an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of those
funds.90 Likewise, on appeal to the Supreme Court, FAIR again presented
these First Amendment arguments as grounds for overturning the Solomon
85. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld ("FAIR If'), 390 F.3d 219,
227 (3d Cir. 2004); Seth Stem, Law Schools Revolt over Pentagon Recruitment on Campus,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 6, 2003, at 2. The "equal treatment" pushed for by the
DoD was at first an informal policy as the Solomon Amendment only required that schools
provide military recruiters with "access." FAIR 11, 390 F.3d at 228. However, in 2005, an
equal treatment provision was added to the Solomon Amendment, which required law
schools to provide military recruiters access "in a manner that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the [degree of] access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other
employer." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86. Greenfield, supra note 18, at A25.
87. Sam Dillon, Law Schools Seek to Regain Ability to Bar Military Recruiters, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at A14.
88. Id.; Stem, supra note 85, at 2.




Amendment." However, despite the presentment of these First Amendment
issues and the fact that the Court could have seized on any one of these First
Amendment issues as the germ of a decision ultimately overturning the So-
lomon Amendment, the Court quickly dismissed the First Amendment ar-
guments and upheld the Solomon Amendment.92
Because each of these First Amendment issues played a large role in
Rumsfeld's appellate history and because each of these First Amendment
issues were placed before the Court-although its decision arguably sides-
tepped them-this subsection will briefly address the status of the Court's
jurisprudence concerning the First Amendment arguments raised by FAIR
via a quick analysis of the seminal cases concerning those First Amendment
issues and the jurisprudence of these issues as presented to the Rums-
feld Court. Accordingly, the following subsections address compelled
speech,93 freedom of association and expressive association,94 and the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.95
1. Compelled Speech
Before the Court, FAIR argued, in part, that the Solomon Amendment
was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to compel the speech of
FAIR's member institutions by requiring those institutions to provide re-
cruiting assistance to military recruiters.96 Accordingly, this subsection will
briefly address the evolution of the Court's compelled speech jurisprudence
and the status of that jurisprudence as presented to the Court in rendering the
Rumsfeld decision.
The Supreme Court first held that compelled speech was a violation of
the First Amendment in the 1943 case of West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette.97 In that case, the West Virginia Board of Education
passed a resolution requiring all schoolchildren within the state to salute the
American flag and recite the pledge of allegiance daily.98 Failure to comply
with the resolution would be considered an "act of insubordination" and
91. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1302-13 (2006).
92. See id. at 1308-13.
93. See infra Part III.D. 1.
94. See infra Part III.D.2.
95. See infra Part III.D.3.
96. See infra Part III.D.3.
97. See 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). It is interesting to note that Rumsfeld was decided
during the current era of heightened patriotism and public support for the military due to the
ongoing war on terrorism while Barnette was decided during the heightened patriotism of
World War II.
98. Id. at 626.
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would be "dealt with accordingly."99 Children of Jehovah's Witnesses, how-
ever, refused to salute the flag and were expelled from school. ° Parents
brought suit seeking to enjoin the flag salute requirement, and the school
board appealed to the Supreme Court.'0 '
On appeal, the Court held that the flag salute requirement violated the
First Amendment because it required students to engage in compelled
speech.0 2 The Court noted that while the law was intended to foster
"[n]ational unity[,] ... which officials may foster by persuasion and exam-
ple," the case presented the question of "whether under our Constitution[,]
compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement."'
0 3
The Court concluded that compelled speech was not a permissible means to
achieve this goal. °' 4 The Court stated that a "compulsory flag salute and
pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind," and that
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein."'0 5 The Court further warned that "[t]hose
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminat-
ing dissenters," and "[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard."'
10 6
Thirty years after Barnette, the Court again struck down a law compel-
ling speech on First Amendment grounds in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.10 7 In that case, the Court struck down a "right of reply" law in Flor-
ida that compelled newspaper editors to publish political candidates' rebut-
tals to critical articles free of charge.0 8 In Tornillo, a candidate for the Flori-
da House of Representatives sought to publish a rebuttal to a negative edi-
99. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100. Id. at 629. The Court explained the following:
The [Jehovah's] Witnesses are an unincorporated body teaching that the obliga-
tion imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal gov-
ernment. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20,
verses 4 and 5, which says: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or
any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or
that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor
serve them." They consider that the flag is an "image" within this command. For
this reason they refuse to salute it.
Id.
101. Id. at 629-30.
102. Id. at 642.
103. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.
104. Id. at 641.
105. Id. at 633, 642.
106. Id. at 641.
107. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
108. Id. at 243-44.
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torial against him that ran in a Florida newspaper.'0 9 After the newspaper
editor refused, the candidate brought suit under the 1913 law."0 In holding
that the right-of-reply law was unconstitutional, the Court rejected the ar-
gument that the right-of-reply statute was not a restriction on the newspa-
per's First Amendment rights because it did not prevent the publisher or
editor from printing anything he or she wished."' Instead, the Court held
that a governmental restraint on speech need not fall into a familiar or tradi-
tional pattern." 2 Rather, the Court determined that the Florida right-of-reply
statute "exact[ed] a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper" be-
cause it penalized editors and publishers "in terms of the cost in printing and
composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be devoted
to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print.""' 3 Further-
more, the Court held that the right-of-reply statute failed First Amendment
scrutiny because the law intruded on the function of editors in deciding what
to print."4
The Court reached a similar decision regarding compelled speech in the
1977 case of Wooley v. Maynard."5 In Wooley, a Jehovah's Witness couple
obscured the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die," on their state-
issued license plates in violation of state law on the grounds that the motto
was repugnant to their religious, moral, and political beliefs. 16 After re-
peated citations and prosecutions for violating the state law, the couple
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement
of the New Hampshire law." 
7
The Court observed that it had to decide whether the state could require
an individual to help the state disseminate an ideological message by requir-
ing the individual to display the message on his or her private property, that
is, a license plate." 8 The Court concluded that the state could not."9 The
Court noted that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 256.
112. Id.
113. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256.
114. Id. at 258.
115. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see also Edward J. Schoen, Margaret M. Hogan & Joseph S.
Falchek, United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial
Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 471 (Spring 2002).






the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectiona-
ble.
, 120
Next, the Court examined whether the state's reasons for compelling
the display of the motto-identification of passenger vehicles and promoting
appreciation of history, individualism, and pride-were compelling enough
to justify requiring the display of the motto on all citizens' license plates.,
21
The Court, however, concluded that those reasons were inadequate as
well.122 The Court held that even though New Hampshire had a legitimate
and substantial reason for requiring the motto to be displayed, vehicle iden-
tification "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental[,]
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.' 23 With
regard to New Hampshire's second reason for requiring the state motto on
license plates, the Court again rejected the State's proffered reason on the
grounds that, no matter how acceptable the message might be to most citi-
zens, that fact could not outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for the message.
24
The Court again overturned the first dissemination of a message in Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission. 125 In that case, the
Court held that the forced dissemination by a private utility of a third-party's
message in its billing materials was an impermissible violation of the First
Amendment. 26 For over sixty years, Pacific Gas had included a monthly
newsletter consisting of general information, energy conservation tips, and
editorials inside its billing envelopes. 27 However, the California Public Util-
ities Commission (CPUC) ruled that the weight and space left over within a
billing envelope constituted "extra space," which was the property of rate-
payers. 28 The CPUC then required that this extra space be made available to
third parties who disagreed with Pacific Gas so that they could disseminate
their messages directly to ratepayers. 129 Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN), a ratemaking group with whom Pacific Gas disagreed, sought an
order from the CPUC requiring Pacific Gas to include its materials in billing
envelopes. 30 The CPUC ruled that Pacific Gas must send out TURN mate-
120. Id. at 715.
121. Id. at 716.
122. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716-17.
123. Id. at 716 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)).
124. Id. at 717.
125. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
126. Id. at 17-21.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. Id. The "extra space" was defined as both the physical room left over in a billing
envelope after the bill and required legal notices had been enclosed and the weight left over
before the billing envelope was charged at the next higher postage rate. Id.
130. Id. at 6-7.
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rials four times yearly for two years.' Pacific Gas appealed the CPUC's
decision, arguing that under Wooley, it could not be forced to help spread a
message with which it disagreed.1
3 2
The Court held that the CPUC's requirement unconstitutionally bur-
dened Pacific Gas's speech and reversed the CPUC decision. 133 The Court
stated that "[c]ompelled access[,] like that ordered in this case[,] both pena-
lizes the expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter
their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set,"'' 34 and it noted that
"[s]uch one-sidedness impermissibly burdens [the] appellant's own expres-
sion.' 35 Despite the CPUC's attempt to classify the extra space in the billing
envelopes as belonging to the ratepayer, this classification did not change
the fact that Pacific Gas's message was being altered. 36 The Court ex-
plained that Pacific Gas still owned the billing envelopes themselves and
that CPUC's order required Pacific Gas to use its own property to distribute
the messages of other parties. 37 Furthermore, the Court observed that be-
cause the billing envelopes contained Pacific Gas's return address, CPUC's
order forced Pacific Gas to not only disseminate TURN's speech, but to
associate itself with TURN's speech. 138 This forced association, in turn, bur-
dened Pacific Gas's expression of differing views and risked forcing Pacific
Gas to speak when it may have preferred to remain silent. 13 The Court
opined that "the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to
say.'
140
The Court finally noted that the access granted in this case was "a con-
tent-based grant of access to private property," which in turn could not be
imposed by the government absent a compelling interest.' 4' However, the
Court held that the state's compelling interest-fair and effective ratemak-
ing-could be met through less intrusive means.
42
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. ,'
43
the Court held that a North Carolina law requiring professional, charitable
131. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 20-21.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 17-18.
138. Id. at 18.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id. at 16-17.
142. Id. at 19.
143. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). In 1985, North Carolina amended its Charitable Solicitations
Act in response to a study that disclosed that certain professional fundraisers had retained
upwards of fifty percent of gross charitable donations as fees and costs. Id. at 784.
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fundraisers to disclose certain information to potential donors upfront-
including what percentage of each donated dollar was retained by the fun-
draisers as costs and fees-violated the First Amendment as unconstitutional
compelled speech.1" In reaching its decision, the Court determined that the
charitable solicitations made by professional fundraisers were protected
speech. 45 Next, the Court decided that "[m]andating speech that a speaker
would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech." '146
The Court concluded that because the North Carolina law was a con-
tent-based regulation, it was subject to "exacting First Amendment scruti-
ny.' 47 The Court considered unavailing the arguments that the compelled
speech involved statements of simple fact, rather than opinion, and reasoned
that compelled statements, whether fact or opinion, were still a burdened,
protected speech."8
The Court then decided that North Carolina's interest in protecting cha-
ritable contributors from fraud by professional fundraisers was "not as
weighty as the State assert[ed], and that the means chosen to accomplish it
[were] unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored" and held the law to be
an unconstitutional compelling of speech. 49 The Court further noted that
there were other, less intrusive means for citizens to be made aware of the
information that the North Carolina law compelled to be provided-for ex-
ample, citizens could simply obtain the information from the state itself, as
the fundraisers were already required to report this information to the
state. 50
In 1995, the Supreme Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston'5' that a private entity that organized
an annual St. Patrick's day parade could not be forced to allow homosexual
and bisexual marchers to take part in the parade. 152 In Hurley, the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), an organiza-
tion of homosexual and bisexual marchers, filed suit against parade organiz-
ers seeking enforcement of a Massachusetts public accommodation law that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'53 A Massachu-
setts state court ordered the parade organizers to allow the GLIB marchers
144. Id.
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id. at 795.
147. Id. at 798.
148. Id. at 797-98.
149. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
150. Id. at 800-01.
151. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
152. Id. at 566.
153. Id. at 570-71.
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to participate, and the parade organizers later appealed to the Supreme
Court.
1 5 4
In deciding the case, the Court observed that "we use the word 'parade'
to indicate marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not just
to each other[,] but to bystanders along the way" and that parades "are thus a
form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of
marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches."' 55
As long as parades are "peaceful and orderly," the Court concluded, they
remain expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment.'56
After determining that a parade was expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment, the Court determined that, like newspaper editors who
enjoy the right to pick and choose what material should appear on an edi-
torial page, the private organizers of the parade enjoyed just as much right to
determine what groups and messages should appear in the parade.'57 The
Court noted that the manner in which the statute was applied had the net
result of altering the expressive content of the parade.'58 The Court further
concluded that "when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is
forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication ad-
vanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compromised,"
and the court held that GLIB could be denied permission to participate in the
private parade, just as GLIB could be denied admission to a private club.'59
Although the cases discussed above do not provide a cohesive, black-
letter analysis of the Court's compelled speech jurisprudence, the cases
"combine to provide a significant level of First Amendment protection[,] not
only to express and tailor views and opinions, but, equally important, to
avoid being identified with expressions of others."1 60 Woven among these
cases are common themes that were also presented to the Court in Rumsfeld,
including the idea that (1) a governmentally required message, even when it
is as innocuous as a license plate motto or a leaflet included in a billing
statement, can still be an intolerable infringement on the First Amendment
rights of the affected individual or organization, and (2) expressive conduct
is just as worthy of First Amendment protections from compulsion as
speech.'16 Combined together, these cases stand for the proposition that "no
government official can proscribe orthodoxy in thought or opinion, or com-
pel an individual by word or act to express, participate, or concur in the dis-
154. Id. at 563-66.
155. Id. at 568.
156. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
157. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.
158. Id. at 572-73.
159. Id. at 576, 580-81.




semination of the ideas or messages of others, ' and demonstrate that the
Solomon Amendment's compelled, military recruiter accommodation is
both arguably expressive and possibly prohibited by the First Amendment.
2. Freedom ofAssociation and Expressive Association
In addition to compelled speech issues, Rumsfeld also presented the
Court with issues surrounding whether or not the Solomon Amendment's
requirements of equal access to military recruiters violated schools' free-
doms of association.1 63 The First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'" 6 Although the
First Amendment does not explicitly protect a freedom of association per se,
the Court has long recognized "as implicit in the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment[,] a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends."'' 65 Accordingly, this subsection will briefly
address those cases leading to the clarification of this right of association.
The freedom of association was first recognized in NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson.66 In that case, the Alabama Attorney General attempted to
compel the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of all of its Ala-
bama members.167 The NAACP refused, however, and was held in contempt
of court. 68 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' . . . [of] freedom of speech."'
169
Then, the Court noted that compelling the NAACP to disclose its member-
ship could have effected a restraint on the NAACP and its members' free-
dom of association and held that the NAACP should not be compelled to
disclose its membership to the State of Alabama. 70 The Court then reversed
the contempt citation. '
7'
162. Id.
163. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1311-12 (2006).
164. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. I
165. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
166. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
167. Id. at451-52.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 460.
170. Id. at 462, 466.
171. Id. at 466.
[Vol. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A quarter-century later, the Supreme Court limited an organization's
freedom of association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.'72 In Roberts,
two Minnesota chapters of the Jaycees began allowing women to join in
contravention of the Jaycee's national bylaws.' When the national organi-
zation threatened to cut off the two Minnesota chapters, the chapters brought
suit alleging that the Jaycees' exclusion of women from full membership
violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
174
In its opinion, the Court stated from the outset that this case required
the Court to "address a conflict between a State's efforts to eliminate gend-
er-based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of
association asserted by members of a private organization."' 75 The Court
also noted that the right of expressive association is not absolute and that
"[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associa-
tional freedoms.' 7 6 Then, the Court held that the state's compelling interest
in eradicating gender discrimination justified the statute's impact on the
Jaycees' associational freedoms. 77 The Court observed that the Minnesota
law did not "aim at the suppression of speech, [and] does not distinguish
between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint."'' 78 The
Court further supported its decision by characterizing membership in the
Jaycees as more like a public accommodation than as "expressive associa-
tion."'
' 79
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte180 and New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,'8' the Su-
preme Court upheld Roberts's reasoning. In both of these cases, the Court
upheld laws requiring organizations to admit women and minorities on the
grounds that (1) the compelling state interest in equality outweighed the
organizations' restrictions and (2) the laws did not require the organizations
to "abandon or alter" any of their activities.1
2
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,'8 3 the Supreme Court revisited its
expressive association case law. 84 In that case, the Boy Scouts dismissed
172. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
173. Id. at 614.
174. Id. at 614-15.
175. Id. at 612.
176. Id. at 623.
177. Id.
178. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
179. Id. at 624.
180. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
181. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
182. N.Y State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13; Rotary Int 7, 481 U.S. at 549.
183. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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Dale, one of their adult members, from the organization after learning of his
homosexuality.'85 Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, and the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court held for
Dale, in part on the grounds that under Rotary Club, requiring the Boy
Scouts to admit Dale did not affect the Boy Scout's activities, and thus, did
not infringe on its expressive association.'86
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 8 7 The Court noted that "[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person
in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association if the
presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints."' 18 8 But, the Court also cautioned, "the
freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute. We
have held that the freedom could be overridden by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associa-
tional freedoms."'
' 89
After determining that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive associa-
tion, the Court addressed the question of whether the inclusion of Dale in
the organization would "significantly affect" its ability to express its view-
points.' 90 The Court concluded the following:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would
have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a par-
ticular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout's choice not to pro-
pound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.' 9'
3. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was the final First Amend-
ment issue presented to the Rumsfeld Court.' 92 The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine evolved from Perry v. Sindermann19' and other cases involv-
184. See generally id.
185. Id. at 644-45.
186. Id. at 646-47.
187. Id. at 661.
188. Id. at 648.
189. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (internal quotations omitted).
190. Id. at 650.
191. Id. at 654.
192. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1306-07 (2006).
193. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
[Vol. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ing governmental employment.'9 4 The doctrine holds that "the government
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitution-
ally protected ... freedom of speech[,] even if he has no entitlement to that
benefit."' 95
In a seminal case concerning the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
Grove City College v. Bell,196 the United States Supreme Court faced the
question of whether the government could constitutionally withhold federal
financial aid assistance to a college that refused to comply with Title IX.' 97
In that case, Grove City College, a small, private liberal arts college, consis-
tently refused governmental assistance in order to maintain its institutional
autonomy.'98 Despite Grove City's desire to remain autonomous, several
students of Grove City received governmental grants to finance their educa-
tion under a Department of Education program, and, as a result, the Depart-
ment of Education determined that Grove City was an eligible institution
receiving federal money under Title IX. 99 The Department of Education
then requested Grove City College to provide certification of compliance
with Title IX as required by the statute, but the college refused.2" Therefore,
the college became ineligible for federal assistance, and its students could
no longer receive such educational grants.2 °'
Grove City College and four students then brought suit against the De-
partment of Education2. 2 and argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the
requirement of compliance with Title IX constituted an infringement on
their First Amendment rights.20 3 The Court, however, dismissed this argu-
ment and explained that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambi-
guous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions
are not obligated to accept."2 ° 4 The Supreme Court noted that Grove City
was free to refuse federal funds under the program and that its students were
free to take their grant dollars to some other institution.2 5 Thus, the Court
194. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996). The Court noted in
Umbehr that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rejects "Justice Holmes' famous dictum,
that a policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
195. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
196. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
197. See id. at 558-59. Title IX prohibits gender discrimination in educational programs
or activities receiving federal funding and provides that such funding will terminate in cases
of non-compliance. Id.
198. Id. at 559.
199. Id. at 559-60.
200. Id. at 560-61.
201. Id. at 561.
202. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 561.





concluded that requiring Grove City to comply with the terms of Title IX as
a condition of receiving federal funds did not infringe the First Amendment
rights of either Grove City or its students.2 °6
On the flip side of the Grove City "reasonable and unambiguous condi-
tions" of federal assistance standard is the Court's jurisprudence regarding
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as set forth in cases like Perry v.
Sinderman.217 In that case, an untenured college professor was not re-hired
by the college after he made public comments critical of, and in opposition
to, the college's board of regents.208 The professor brought suit against the
college on the grounds that the college's refusal to re-hire him was a viola-
tion of his First Amendment freedom of speech.20 9
In deciding the case, the Court first answered the question of whether
the fact that the professor had no contractual or tenure rights to re-
employment precluded his First Amendment claims. 21' The Court observed
that it had "made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valua-
ble, governmental benefit, and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely., 21 Furthermore, the Court observed that the
government may not deny a governmental benefit in a way that "infringes
[on a person's] constitutionally protected interests[,] especially [the per-
son's] interest in freedom of speech."2 2 The Court concluded as follows:
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow
the government to 'produce a result [that it] could not command direct-
ly.' Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.213
The Court noted that this principle has been applied in cases involving
denial of tax exemptions, unemployment benefits, welfare payments, and
public employment.2 14 The Court held that, despite the professor's lack of a
"guaranteed" governmental benefit (for example, no right to being automat-
ically re-employed by the college), the professor could nonetheless state a
206. Id. at 575-76.
207. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
208. Id. at 594-95.
209. Id. at 595.
210. Id. at 596.
211. Id. at 597.
212. Id.




cause of action alleging that a governmental benefit had been denied to him
in a manner that violated his First Amendment rights.2"5
Although the above discussion is not an exhaustive analysis of the
Court's jurisprudence regarding compelled speech, freedom of association,
and unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the brief survey of key cases in
these areas demonstrates the depth of the First Amendment issues presented
to the Court by Rumsfeld, each of which were used with success by FAIR in
its prior victory before the Third Circuit. However, as the Reasoning section
demonstrates, the Court made relatively short work of FAIR's First
Amendment claims in delivering its opinion upholding the Solomon
Amendment.
IV. REASONING
In Rumsfeld, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that
the Solomon Amendment's conditioning of federal funding on institutions
of higher education providing equal access to military recruiters did not vi-
olate those institutions' freedoms of speech and association under the First
Amendment.2 6 The Court rejected FAIR's arguments that the Solomon
Amendment placed unconstitutional conditions on law schools' receipt of
federal funding and determined that pursuant to its Spending Clause power
and its power to raise and support armies, Congress could impose the Solo-
mon Amendment's conditions directly.217 The Court also rejected FAIR's
other constitutional arguments and held that the Solomon Amendment (1)
compelled only conduct by the law schools, and not speech, (2) did not force
law schools to accommodate the military's message, and (3) did not other-
wise violate the law schools' right of expressive association.2"8
A. The Solomon Amendment Does Not Impose an Unconstitutional Con-
dition
In its opinion, the Court immediately addressed the merits of FAIR's
arguments that the Solomon Amendment created an unconstitutional condi-
215. Id. at 596-98.
216. See generally Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (2006). Justice Samuel Alito did not take part in the decision as the case was argued
before his confirmation to the Court. Charlie Savage, Court Backs Military on Campuses,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2006, at Al.
217. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1306-07.
218. Id. at 1304-13. The Court also addressed an argument by FAIR concerning the
Solomon Amendment's interpretation. Id. at 1304-06. However, FAIR's arguments regard-
ing interpretation were brought up for the first time during the Supreme Court appeal and
were quickly dismissed by the Court. Id. at 1305-06. Therefore, those arguments are not
discussed in this note.
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tion on the law schools' federal funding.219 The Court explained that under
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a condition placed on funding is not
unconstitutional if the funding condition could be imposed directly (and
constitutionally) by Congress. 220 Thus, the Court observed that FAIR's un-
constitutional conditions argument turned on whether Congress could direct-
ly impose the Solomon Amendment's conditions on law schools through
some other power.22 ' The Court then concluded that Congress could directly
impose the Solomon Amendment's conditions on law schools using its
power to raise and support armies under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion.22 The Court held that Congress's power to raise armies was broad
enough to include the authority to open law school campuses to military
recruitment.223
In further support of its conclusion, the Court noted that "'judicial defe-
rence . . . is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to
raise and support armies. ' 224 The Court also held that, although Congress
had chosen to pursue its objective-allowing military recruiters equal access
to campuses-indirectly through its Spending Clause power and not directly
through its power to raise and support armies, the courts should give Con-
gress wide deference in this area of military affairs.225
B. The Solomon Amendment Did Not Otherwise Violate the First
Amendment Rights of Speech and Association of the Law Schools
Despite the Court's conclusion that Congress could directly impose the
Solomon Amendment's conditions on law schools, the Court was careful to
caution that this power, though broad, was still limited by the First Amend-
ment.226 Accordingly, the Court examined and quickly disposed of each First
Amendment claim brought by FAIR.22 7
1. The Solomon Amendment Regulates Conduct, Not Speech
First, the Court explained that precedents such as Barnette and Woo-
ley had long established that the government had no power to "tell[] people
what they must say., 22 8 The Court then distinguished the Solomon Amend-
219. Id. at 1307.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1306.
223. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
224. Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)).
225. Id.
226. Id.




ment from the mandatory flag-salute and license-plate-motto laws at issue in
Barnette and Wooley. 229 The Solomon Amendment, the Court held, required
only compelled statements of fact-for example, that a military recruiter
would be on campus from 1:00 to 5:00-and not compelled statements of
opinion. 2" Although the Court conceded that statements of fact are still pro-
tected by the First Amendment, it noted that the instant statements were
easily distinguished from those in other compelled speech cases because
they were merely incidental to the conduct that was being compelled by the
Solomon Amendment. 23 ' The Court refuted FAIR's arguments that posting
flyers and sending e-mails constituted protected speech by noting that, al-
though speech may be incidental to some compelled conduct, the fact that
someone happened to use speech in completing an otherwise non-expressive
compelled conduct was not enough by itself to classify the conduct as pro-
tected speech.232 In holding that the Solomon Amendment compelled con-
duct and not speech, the Court was careful to further distinguish this case
from Barnette and Wooley with the following parting shot:
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recrui-
ters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as forcing
a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display
the motto "Live Free or Die," and it trivializes the freedom protected in
Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.
233
2. The Solomon Amendment Did Not Force Law Schools to Accom-
modate the Military's Message
Next, the Court held that the Solomon Amendment did not impermissi-
bly attempt to force law schools to host or accommodate the military's mes-
sage.23 ' The Court noted that under cases such as Pacific Gas, Tornillo, and
Hurley, the forced accommodation of speakers violated the First Amend-
ment.235 However, the Court pointed out that in each of these cases, the First
Amendment violation resulted from the fact that the speaker's message was
affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate-for example, in Hur-
ley, the parade organizers' anti-homosexual speech and beliefs were affected
by being forced to accommodate homosexual parade marchers.236 In this
case, however, the Court held that a forced accommodation of the military's





234. Id. at 1309.




speech did not violate the First Amendment rights of the law schools be-
cause their decisions to allow recruiters on campus were not inherently ex-
pressive."3 7 The Court concluded that, unlike a parade, newspaper, or other
expressive medium, the Solomon Amendment's mandate that law schools
accommodate military recruiters did not sufficiently interfere with the
schools' messages.23' The Court dismissed FAIR's concern that law students
might misinterpret the schools' accommodation of military recruiters as an
endorsement of the military's speech with the quip that "[w]e have held that
high school students can appreciate the difference between speech a school
sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to do so,
pursuant to an equal access policy. Surely students have not lost that ability
by the time they get to law school. 239
3. The Solomon Amendment Did Not Violate the Law Schools'
Rights of Expressive Association
Finally, the Court rejected FAIR's arguments that the Solomon
Amendment violated the law schools' right of expressive association by
requiring the law schools to associate with a group with which they did not
agree-the military.24° FAIR argued that, by requiring law schools to ac-
commodate military recruiters, the Solomon Amendment had significantly
affected the law schools' ability to express the idea that sexual-orientation
discrimination is wrong.241
The Court, however, held that while under Dale the forced inclusion of
a gay scoutmaster would alter the Boy Scouts' message, the Solomon
Amendment did not similarly affect the law schools' associational rights.242
The Court zeroed in on the fact that the Solomon Amendment required law
schools to temporarily invite military recruiters on campus and briefly inte-
ract with recruiters but did not require military recruiters to otherwise asso-
ciate with the law school. 43 Thus, the Court reasoned, unlike Dale, the So-
lomon Amendment did not force the law schools to accept members that
they otherwise would decline.2' Rather, military recruiters at all times main-
tained their identity as "outsiders who [came] onto campus for the limited
237. Id. at 1309-10.
238. Id. at 1310.
239. Id. (parenthetical omitted).
240. Id. at 1312.






purpose of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's
expressive association. 245
C. The Court's Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court held that FAIR had attempted to
"stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort of
activities these doctrines protect., 246 The Court concluded that FAIR's at-
tempts to portray itself as the "the schoolchildren in Barnette, the parade
organizers in Hurley, and the Boy Scouts in Dale" exaggerated the expres-
sive nature of the law schools' position regarding military recruiters, over-
stated the impact of the Solomon Amendment on the law schools' anti-
sexual-discrimination ideals, and exaggerated the reach of the Court's pre-
vious First Amendment precedents.247 The Court then held that, because
Congress did have the power to require law schools to provide equal access
to military recruiters without violating the law schools' First Amendment
freedoms of speech and association, the Solomon Amendment did not vi-
olate the First Amendment.248
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Rumsfeld is significant
in three respects. First, the Court's willingness to rely on Congress's power
to raise and maintain armies as justification for denying FAIR's First
Amendment claims with little further analysis seems to suggest that the cur-
rent Court may be more willing to defer to Congress's power in military
affairs in the future.249 Second, the Court's quick dismissal of FAIR's First
Amendment claims, when coupled with its rebuke and admonition of FAIR
for arguing that the Solomon Amendment was analogous to the various laws
that had been overturned in other significant First Amendment precedent,
suggests that the current Court may be less-than-friendly to academics and
schools who choose to accept federal money and then decry the conditions
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1313 (emphasis omitted).
247. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
248. Id.
249. See infra Part V.A. It is interesting to note that less than four months after issuing its
ruling in Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court took a seemingly anti-war-on-terror and anti-military
approach when it held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that enemy combatants held by the United
States military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were entitled to Geneva Convention protections.
See generally 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). However, the Hamdan case is easily distinguished
from Rumsfeldbecause Hamdan involved actions taken by the President in prosecuting the




placed on that money. 250 And third, as the first major opinion authored by
Chief Justice Roberts,251 the opinion delivered in Rumsfeld may foreshadow
the tone of the current Court's future opinions.252 This section will address
each of these concerns in turn.
A. Is the Current Court More Willing to Defer to Congress on Military
Matters?
Rumsfeld is significant in that the case may show that the Roberts
Court is more than willing to defer to Congress's power to raise and support
armies. In its opinion, the Court not only agreed with the DoD that the So-
lomon Amendment did not violate the First Amendment rights of law
schools, but also adopted the DoD's argument that equal access to law stu-
dents was a vital part of Congress's power to raise and support armies. Ra-
ther than back up this conclusion with further reasoning or justification, the
Court simply concluded that "there is no dispute in this case that [Con-
gress's power to raise and support armies] includes the authority to require
campus access for military recruiters. 253 The Rumsfeld decision both fails to
provide further justification for how obtaining equal access to law students
implicates Congress's power to raise and support armies, and it fails to seize
on any of a variety of First Amendment arguments presented for overturning
the Solomon Amendment. This inaction suggests that the current Court is
more willing to defer to actions taken by Congress that are related to sup-
porting the United States Military, rather than carefully analyzing those de-
cisions to determine if they are truly vital to raising or supporting armies.
Perhaps, however, what is most interesting about the Rumsfeld decision
is what remained unsaid by the Court. As prime-time television and an in-
creasing number of "out" celebrities indicate, American popular culture has
grown increasingly aware and accepting of homosexuals. Further, as recent
gains by proponents of gay rights in areas such as gay marriage demonstrate,
gay rights seem to be gaining widespread approval and acceptance in Amer-
ican society.
Although Rumsfeld directly presented only issues concerning the So-
lomon Amendment and the First Amendment to the Court and not issues
concerning the military's discrimination against homosexuals, those back-
ground issues concerning homosexual discrimination were still indirectly
presented to the Court by the facts of the case. Thus, with Rumsfeld, the
Court was presented with the opportunity to make a statement (or even state
250. See infra Part V.B.
251. David G. Savage, Ruling Lets the Military Recruit on Campuses, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2006, at A10.
252. See infra Part V.C.
253. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
[Vol. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
a position) concerning homosexual discrimination with its decisions in much
the same way that the Court had "set the curve" with regard to civil rights
with its then-controversial decisions of the 1950s and 1960s concerning
subjects such as segregation and racial discrimination. However, rather than
use Rumsfeld as an opportunity to invalidate the Solomon Amendment and
take a stance on gay rights (or, if the majority was unwilling to do so, estab-
lish a dissenting opinion on the subject for posterity), the Court instead
chose to let this opportunity to at least speak out concerning the underlying
issue of gay rights pass it by without comment.
B. Is the Current Court More Hardened to the First Amendment Claims of
Academics and Institutions of Higher Learning?
In Rumsfeld, the Court dismissed FAIR's arguments that the Solomon
Amendment violated law schools' various First Amendment rights with
little discussion-in fact, for an opinion dealing with so many First
Amendment issues, the Court's slip opinion consisted of only twenty-one
pages.254 Additionally, in dismissing FAIR's constitutional claims, the Court
made several jabs at FAIR's expense, including commenting that "by the
time they get to law school," students can surely appreciate the difference
between school-sponsored speech and speech a school is legally required to
permit.25 Further, the Court essentially scolded FAIR for arguing that the
Solomon Amendment's prohibitions were analogous to the laws struck
down by the Court in famous cases, such as Wooley and Barnette, by com-
menting that FAIR's reliance on those cases "trivializes the freedom pro-
tected in Barnette and Wooley. ' '256 When the relative lack of attention that
was paid by the Court to FAIR's constitutional claims is read in light of
these verbal spars against FAIR, the Court's opinion in Rumsfeld suggests
that the current Court-like Representative Pombo who contended that aca-
demics live in an "ivory tower" and have alienated themselves from socie-
ty257 -may view academics with some disdain and may in fact be somewhat
hardened to the First Amendment claims of academics and schools in gener-
al.
C. Does the Case Set the Tone of the Roberts Court?
Finally, the decision reached by the United States Supreme Court in
Rumsfeld is important in that it represents the first major constitutional opi-
254. Id. at 1302-13.
255. Id. at 1310.
256. Id. at 1308.
257. 140 CONG. REc. H3860 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Pombo); see
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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nion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts since his appointment to the Court,
and it may indicate the future tone of the Court's decisions. In this case, the
Court delivered a relatively short opinion that was directly limited to the
issues raised by the parties, and the court included little dicta or other extra-
neous material. Further, despite the multitude of First Amendment issues
raised by this case-any one of which the Court could have (and has in the
past with other social issues) seized upon as grounds for overturning the
Solomon Amendment-the Court failed to invoke any of these First
Amendment issues as grounds for overturning the Solomon Amendment.
Additionally, the opinion relies largely on precedent for each question
raised, and it overturned no existing precedent. Given that the Court (1)
largely deferred to Congress's constitutional power to raise and maintain
armies, (2) refused to take the opportunity to address the multitude of First
Amendment claims presented by the case, and (3) issued a short opinion that
relied largely on precedent, the opinion in Rumsfeld may indicate that the
Roberts Court may take a more conservative tone in its future decisions,
may rely heavily on precedent, and otherwise refuse to "think outside the
box."
The fact that the Court delivered a unanimous opinion in Rumsfeld may
also be significant in itself. The facts and issues presented by this case-
sexual orientation discrimination by the military and various First Amend-
ment issues concerning governmentally compelled speech-presented more
than ample opportunity for members of the Court to split along ideological
lines and render lengthy opinions supporting or refuting the Solomon
Amendment and its wider implications on American society, as the Court
has so often done in the past.258 However, rather than issue a split ruling, the
seven other members of the Court who participated in the decision instead
joined in Chief Justice Robert's opinion. 259 Thus, Rumsfeld may signal that
the justices comprising the current Court may be more likely to avoid split-
ting on ideological lines in the future and may, instead, work towards deli-
vering unanimous, or near unanimous, opinions on important constitutional
or decisive issues.
258. The fact that the Court rendered a unanimous opinion in Rumsfeld and did not split
along ideological lines is particularly interesting considering that the case involved several
First Amendment issues, and that one of the Court's "liberal" Justices who joined in the
Court's dismissal of these claims-Ruth Bader Ginsburg-was the former chief legal counsel
for the American Civil Liberties Union. Robert J. Caldwell, Judging Alito: A Republican
Majority Ensures Confirmation, but Many Democrats Are Balking, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,





Thanks to its Spending Clause power, Congress exercises the power to
condition federal funding on compliance with regulations that Congress is
otherwise without power to impose under the Constitution. Cases such as
Dole and Perry, however, have established that the Spending Clause does
not give Congress unlimited power to legislate indirectly through spend-
ing-for example, the Court has held that Congress may not parcel out go-
vernmental benefits in a way that infringes on an individual's constitutional
rights, even though that individual may have no right or obligation to re-
ceive the governmental benefit.26 Accordingly, when Rumsfeld came before
the Court, the Court's own prior precedent (and in fact Rumsfeld's own prior
appellate history) established that (1) association (and the right to be free
from mandatory association) is considered to be speech protected by the
First Amendment, and (2) Congress cannot establish unconstitutional condi-
tions on this speech through the selective use of its Spending Clause powers.
However, instead of using the First Amendment to overturn the Solo-
mon Amendment, the Rumsfeld Court rejected the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as it applies to the First Amendment rights of institutions of
higher education in the case of the Solomon Amendment. Rather than fol-
low precedent, such as Perry, and hold that the Solomon Amendment in-
fringed on institutions' First Amendment rights, the Court instead concluded
that the schools' First Amendment claims were not infringed by the Solo-
mon Amendment or were so minimally infringed that the institutions were
not entitled to First Amendment safeguards. As a result, the Court upheld
the Solomon Amendment's prohibition on the expressive speech of insti-
tutes of higher education.
In Rumsfeld, three distinct ways of thinking collided: (1) the law
schools' long commitment to anti-sexual-orientation-discrimination policies,
(2) the military's longtime discrimination against homosexuals, and (3)
Congress's desire that academics should either grant military recruiters
equal access to students or else forego federal funding. As this note demon-
strates, ultimately the will of the military and Congress won out. With the
decision, law schools and other institutions of higher learning now have
three choices: (1) either compromise or change non-sexual-orientation poli-
cies and allow military recruiters equal access to students, (2) ban all recrui-
ters whatsoever from campus, or (3) hold to anti-sexual-discrimination poli-
cies and forego federal funding. Under Rumsfeld, it appears that institutions
of higher learning may no longer continue to accept federal money
260. See generally discussion supra Parts I, III.D.3.
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while at the same time decrying the conditions Congress places on the re-
ceipt of that money.
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